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Stirring the Pot:  A Response to Rothman’s Right of Publicity 
Stacey Dogan* 
Any commentary on Jennifer Rothman’s terrific book has to begin with a 
compliment to her extraordinary commitment to the right of publicity.  For the 
uninitiated, her website, Rothman’s Roadmap to the Right of Publicity, provides a 
treasure trove of information about the right of publicity in each of the fifty states.1  
Professor Rothman has also written several articles and a number of excellent amicus 
briefs in some of the most important right-of-publicity cases in recent years.2  Finally, 
this latest contribution—her book—harnesses this exhaustive research and presents 
it as a historical narrative that is comprehensive, thoughtful, and readable.3  This 
book will serve as required reading for scholars, lawyers, and historians trying to 
understand the history, foundations, and key attributes of this perplexing area of law.  
Despite my admiration for Professor Rothman and her work, I view the role of a 
commentator as stirrer of the pot; so, while I agree with much of what she says in her 
book and her talk, I am going to focus on three points where I have a somewhat 
different perspective:  first, the relationship between “privacy” and “publicity;” 
second, the role of alienability; and finally, prognosis and cure—or why the right of 
publicity is so hard, and how we might restore balance to this unwieldy cause of 
action. 
 
 * Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor & Law Alumni Scholar, Boston University 
School of Law.  This is a slightly modified version of my comments in response to Professor Rothman’s 
keynote address at the Kernochan Center’s Symposium, “Owning Personality:  The Expanding Right of 
Publicity.”  Thanks to the Kernochan Center for the opportunity to participate, to other participants for 
fruitful questions, comments, and conversation, and to the staff of the Columbia Journal for Law and the 
Arts for a smooth and timely publication process. 
 1. ROTHMAN’S ROADMAP TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, https://perma.cc/2FM7-VXKQ (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
 2. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185 (2012); 
Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199 (2002); 
Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property and Constitutional Law Professors in Support of Defendants-
Appellants, De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625 (Ct. App. 2018) (No. B285629); 
Brief of 31 Constitutional Law and Intellectual Property law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, Electronic Arts, Inc. v. Davis, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1448 (2016) (No. 15-424).  
 3. JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:  PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC 
WORLD (Harvard Univ. Press 2018) [hereinafter ROTHMAN]. 
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I. PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY  
The book’s central contention is that the law took a wrong turn when it began to 
treat “privacy” and “publicity” as distinct concepts rather than under the broad 
umbrella of the “right of privacy.”  If courts had stuck with the original formulation, 
the book suggests, we might have avoided some of the more egregious expansions 
of the right and the attendant tensions with speech and other interests.4  
The problem with this argument, though, is that Rothman’s own telling gives little 
reason for confidence that a privacy framework would have constrained growth of 
the right any more than “publicity” has.  In particular, a privacy right broad enough 
to encompass the disparate values she attributes to it would likely suffer the same 
expansionist tendencies as the existing right of publicity.  To see why, consider two 
paradoxical claims at the center of Rothman’s argument. 
First, Rothman describes the early-twentieth-century right of privacy as 
extraordinarily broad, in both normative and doctrinal terms.  It protected public as 
well as private figures.5  It protected economic as well as personal interests.6  It 
guarded not only against harm in the form of hurt feelings or damaged reputations, 
but also against exploitation of individuals’ names, images, or other personal 
indicia.7  Indeed, this right against exploitation could extend to the use of a person’s 
identity in fictional works.8  Rothman describes the right in the broadest possible 
terms:  “From the start there was a property-based conception of the right of privacy. 
It was understood as a right of self-ownership.”9 
This expansive account of privacy is essential to Rothman’s attempt to debunk 
the conventional wisdom around the right of publicity.  In particular, she argues that 
if courts had appreciated the breadth of the right of privacy, they would never have 
seen a need to create an independent publicity right.10  According to Rothman, the 
Haelan court—which first recognized a separate right of publicity11—based its 
decision on a cramped and inaccurate reading of existing law.  Specifically, she 
argues that if the court had appreciated the full scope of the right of privacy, it could 
have resolved the case on that basis.12  Instead, “[i]n so misreading state law, the 
 
 4. See, e.g., id. at 7 (describing the right of publicity as “a misunderstood, misshapen, bloated 
monster” that “got off track when it transformed from a personal right . . . into a powerful intellectual 
property right”). 
 5. See id. at 30–44. 
 6. Id. at 43–44 (noting that “public figures retained a broad right of privacy and could enforce it, 
and even recover economic damages without regard to whether they suffered emotional distress or specific 
reputational harm”). 
 7. Id. at 38–39. 
 8. Id. at 38 (“Fictional uses [of identity], such as the movie from Binns [v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 
210 N.Y. 51 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1913)], were deemed exploitative and for trade purposes, while non-fiction 
uses were not.”). 
 9. Id. at 48. 
 10. Id. at 43–44. 
 11. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 12. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 61 (“The suggestion by the Second Circuit—that absent a right of 
publicity the players would not have been able to prevent Topps’s (or Haelan’s) use of their names and 
likenesses if such uses had been without permission—was unquestionably wrong.”). 
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federal appellate court in Haelan marked the beginning of federal courts taking the 
lead in improperly developing and expanding the right of publicity—a state law.”13 
Whatever the merits of Rothman’s claim as a descriptive matter,14 it clashes with 
her book’s core premise that the right of privacy would have avoided the excesses of 
the “misunderstood, misshapen, bloated monster” that the right of publicity has 
purportedly become.15  Although the book repeatedly asserts that privacy offers a 
more modest alternative to the right of publicity, that proposition seems unlikely in 
a privacy right as capacious and unbounded as the one that Rothman describes.  If, 
indeed, the right of privacy encompassed both harm-based and exploitation-based 
claims and protected public figures as well as private ones, then there is no reason to 
think it would have served as a bulwark against expansionist tendencies.  Indeed, 
privacy could well have led to even greater threats to speech.  As Rothman 
documents in the book, the anti-exploitation impulse, paired with attention to 
dignitary concerns, sometimes led courts to award damages in privacy cases 
involving fictionalized movies based on real-life people.16  While courts may well 
have developed robust defenses to guard against these results, the book does not 
explain why such defenses would fare better against a right of privacy than they do 
under a right of publicity regime.17 
In short, I am not convinced that a right of privacy—at least the one that Rothman 
describes in this book—would have constrained the growth of the right or reduced 
the threats that it poses to speech, copyright interests, and related concerns. 
II. ALIENABILITY AND TRANSFERABILITY 
Despite their many similarities in purpose and scope, the privacy and publicity 
rights described in the book diverge with respect to one critical attribute:  alienability.  
Unlike the more personal, inalienable privacy right, publicity rights constitute 
independent economic interests that may be exclusively licensed, transferred, sold, 
and, in some states, passed on through will or intestacy after death.  
 
 13. Id. 
 14. While Rothman makes a strong case that some mid-twentieth-century courts and scholars 
exaggerated the limitations of the right of privacy, her account suffers from some lack of precision and, 
in some cases, arguable inaccuracy in its eagerness to make its point.  In discussing O’Brien v. Pabst Sales 
Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941), for example, Rothman contends that “the primary basis for rejecting 
[the plaintiff’s] claim was that the ‘use of [a] photograph [of him] was by permission.’”  Id. at 42.  In 
reality, however, the O’Brien court gave several reasons for rejecting the claim, including the fact that the 
plaintiff was a public person who had sought out publicity.  124 F.2d at 170 (“Assuming then, what is by 
no means clear, that an action for right of privacy would lie in Texas at the suit of a private person, we 
think it clear that the action fails; because plaintiff is not such a person and the publicity he got was only 
that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving; and because the use of the photograph was by 
permission, and there were no statements or representations made in connection with it, which were or 
could be either false, erroneous or damaging to plaintiff.”) (emphasis added).  
 15. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 7. 
 16. See id. at 37–38 (citing Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of Am., 210 N.Y. 51 (1913)). 
 17. See, e.g., De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625 (Ct. App. 2018) 
(recognizing First Amendment defense against actress’s right-of-publicity claim based on fictional 
portrayal of her in a television miniseries). 
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In Rothman’s portrayal, alienability converts the right of publicity into a vehicle 
that harms identity holders’ interests rather than helping them.  From an economic 
perspective, the book contends that individuals would be better off if the law 
prevented them from assigning their rights, including the right to sue.18  More 
ominously, the book warns that alienability can injure identity-holders in myriad 
ways, ranging from speech restrictions to loss of control over identity to effective 
enslavement.19  Given these harms, the book expresses puzzlement over the Screen 
Actors Guild’s support for alienable publicity rights, which she suggests must have 
resulted from a lack of awareness of their risks.20  “If the right to publicity is truly 
transferable, then these laws, rather than furthering the interests of its constituents, 
allow for SAG-AFTRA’s members to lose control over their own identities—
potentially forever, even after they die.”21  Eliminating alienability, she argues, 
would “fix many of the right’s excesses” and “provide[] guidance for resolving its 
growing conflicts with free speech and with copyright laws.”22  
Here again, however, the book arguably proves too little and claims too much.  
The book’s economic claim—that identity holders would benefit financially from a 
rule against alienability—relies on anecdote and speculation, rather than empirical 
data or economic theory.23  Undoubtedly, American Idol contestants and NCAA 
athletes suffer from exploitation at the hands of powerful commercial interests.  
Indeed, in Haelan itself, the individual baseball players may well have been better 
off if the law had prevented them from conveying exclusive licenses to one baseball 
card manufacturer.24  But to assess the economic impact of transferability on identity-
holders more generally would require a more rigorous inquiry into the relative gains 
from exclusive licenses versus non-exclusive ones.  Economic theory suggests that 
the ability to give exclusive licenses may benefit identity-holders by commanding a 
higher price.  This intuition helps to explain SAG-AFTRA’s support for alienability:  
the ability to sign exclusive licenses likely allows its members to maximize their 
potential earnings on endorsements and other licensing deals.  Alienability may or 
may not serve the interests of identity-holders across society; in many contexts 
(including Haelan), the disparate bargaining power between the parties makes it 
likely that the identity holder will get the short end of the stick.  But it is important 
 
 18. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 116 (“Achieving . . . transferability was . . . the primary motive for 
the shift away from the right of privacy and toward the right of publicity, but it has never served the 
interests of identity-holders upon whom the right is purportedly based.”). 
 19. See id. at 130 (quoting Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905)). 
 20. Id. at 117 (“SAG-AFTRA so far has seemed unaware of the risks that these laws pose to the 
very people it represents.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 137. 
 23. Id. at 132–33 (contending that alienability “primarily rewards third parties rather than identity 
holders”). 
 24. Haelan involved baseball players who had granted exclusive licenses to a single manufacturer 
to make and sell baseball cards with their images.  As Rothman explains, the players lacked legal 
representation and typically gave little thought to the contracts, signing them hastily and often failing to 
read the terms.  Id. at 53–54.  Given that context, the players’ compensation likely fell far short of the 
value of the exclusive licenses that they signed, and they may well have earned more by licensing their 
image to multiple firms.  
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to recognize the net effect of alienability as an empirical point, on which the book 
offers speculation rather than evidence. 
While its economic claims stand on speculative footing, the book’s warning about 
other harms from alienability relies on a false dichotomy between non-transferability 
and complete alienation.  Alienability, Rothman argues, threatens the very 
foundations of individual personhood:  “[T]he possibility of a truly alienable right of 
publicity is a chilling one—such unfettered transferability would put control and 
ownership of a person’s identity in the hands of third parties.”25  This dystopian view 
of alienability treats it as an all-or-nothing choice:  The law must either prohibit 
alienation or allow unrestricted transfers of people’s names, images, and 
personalities to third parties.  The book gives only passing reference to a third option 
of allowing some forms of exclusive licenses, but blocking them when they would 
threaten individual liberties such as employment mobility or freedom of speech.26  
By refusing to entertain this more nuanced approach, the book uses alienability as a 
straw man—a one-dimensional on-off switch—rather than a flexible doctrine 
responsive to normative concerns.  As such, alienability bears responsibility for all 
manner of dire consequences:  some real, some imagined, and some that, upon 
examination, have nothing to do with transferability of publicity rights. 
Many of the book’s concerns about alienability involve the loss of individuals’ 
ability to define themselves through their lifestyle, speech, and choice of work.  “If 
the right is transferable,” the book contends, “then publicity holders could restrict a 
variety of fundamental rights held by identity holders—such as controlling what an 
identity holder can say or do, or compelling speech and associations by using the 
identity holder’s image, name, likeness, or voice.”27  Publicity holders could also 
limit the identity holder’s career choices:  “If an actor cannot assign, license, or waive 
right of publicity claims for the limited purposes of a motion picture or television 
series because a third party owns her publicity rights, producers will not hire that 
actor.”28  
Although restrictions like these would indeed provide cause for concern, courts 
could address them with existing legal doctrines, without prohibiting alienability 
altogether.  In California, for example, state law provides that “[e]very contract by 
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business 
of any kind is to that extent void.”29  Just as they do with employment contracts 
generally, California courts could invoke this provision to invalidate any right-of-
publicity transfer that effectively prevented someone from practicing her profession 
or trade.30  Other states apply a balancing test to evaluate non-compete agreements.31  
 
 25. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 115. 
 26. See, e.g., id. at 137. 
 27. Id. at 129. 
 28. Id. at 130. 
 29. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (2017).  
 30. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 291 (Cal. 2008) (California courts 
“have consistently affirmed that [S]ection 16600 evinces a settled legislative policy in favor of open 
competition and employee mobility.”).  
 31. See, e.g., Perry v. Moran, 748 P.2d 224, 228 (Wash. 1987), modified on reconsideration, 766 
P.2d 1096 (Wash. 1989) (“Whether a covenant is reasonable involves a consideration of three factors:  (1) 
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The same approach could distinguish between reasonable exclusive licenses and 
unreasonable restraints on individuals’ fundamental rights.  Indeed, as Rothman 
acknowledges, at least one court has refused to allow an involuntary transfer of 
publicity rights to creditors, finding that “neither the law, nor the limits of [the] 
court’s equity jurisdiction, support outright transfer of a . . . debtor’s inter vivos right 
of publicity.”32  In other words, accepting the possibility of alienability does not 
require courts to enforce all transfers of publicity rights.  The book’s contrary 
assumption inflates the harms from alienability.   
Whatever the misimpression caused by this all-or-nothing view of alienability, the 
book’s more troubling gaffe comes in attributing to alienability harms that have little 
to do with transfer of publicity rights.  For example, the book uses alienability of the 
right of publicity to explain the artist Prince’s decision “to change his name to an 
unpronounceable symbol when Warner Brothers controlled the use of his name under 
a lengthy recording contract, and prevented him from making the music and public 
appearances that he wanted.”33  In fact, Prince’s decision was motivated by 
dissatisfaction with his recording contract, which gave the label control over how 
many albums he could record.34  He changed his name—and performed with the 
word “slave” written across his cheek—in protest of the label’s restrictive policies.35  
Such artificial limits on artistic productivity may well exploit artists and disserve the 
public,36 but their legality does not depend on the transferability of publicity rights.  
Even if the law prohibited Prince from assigning his right of publicity, his recording 
studio could enforce its contractual restriction against him.  Invalidating that 
restriction would require a more fundamental change to contract and employment 
law.  
The book similarly misattributes harms suffered by children due to parental 
“assignment” of publicity rights.  Rothman discusses two cases in which parents 
purportedly “assigned, often unwittingly, their children’s right of publicity with no 
opportunity for the children to recapture them.”37  In both cases, courts rebuffed later 
efforts to “reclaim” the images and to prevent their use in ways that the parents or 
the children viewed as harmful.38  Admittedly, both of these examples are profoundly 
 
whether restraint is necessary for the protection of the business or goodwill of the employer, (2) whether 
it imposes upon the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to secure the employer’s 
business or goodwill, and (3) whether the degree of injury to the public is such loss of the service and skill 
of the employee as to warrant nonenforcement of the covenant.”) (citation omitted). 
 32. See Goldman v. Simpson, 2006 WL 6845603 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006). 
 33. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 120. 
 34. Both of the articles that the book cites in support of the Prince story are in accord on this point.  
See Stephanie Merry, The Story Behind Why Prince Changed His Name to a Symbol, WASH. POST (Apr. 
22, 2016), https://perma.cc/MLX4-RUU4; Geoffrey Himes, ‘Emancipation’:  Prince-ly Freedom, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 10, 1997), https://perma.cc/HAR7-3SHH.  
 35. Himes, supra note 34. 
 36. See id. (“If . . . you’re a prolific talent like [Prince], who creates dozens of songs every year, 
such an artificial limitation prevents much of your work from enjoying the public interaction that both 
artists and audiences crave.”). 
 37. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 121. 
 38. Id. (citing Faloona ex rel. Fredrickson v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E.2d 108 (N.Y. 1983)). 
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disturbing and illustrate the need for limits on the enforceability of parental consent.  
But neither of the examples had anything to do with assignment of publicity rights.  
In both cases, the parents had signed a release allowing the use of their children’s 
images.  Such a release—a form of non-exclusive license—does not require 
alienability of publicity rights; indeed, it does not require publicity rights at all.  
Absent some public policy exception, a release signed by a legally competent party 
would bar a subsequent privacy claim by that party as well.  Eliminating alienability, 
in other words, would do nothing to address the harm with which Rothman is 
concerned.39  
In short, the book’s chapter on alienability overstates its threats to identity holders, 
underestimates potential benefits, and fails to consider alternatives to outright 
prohibition.  Courts could easily develop tools to limit the damages that worry 
Rothman, while still preserving the ability of individuals and licensees to enter into 
certain exclusive contracts involving name, voice, or identity.  
III. PROGNOSIS AND CURE 
Despite these differences over the role of alienability and the roots of the 
publicity/speech conflict, I applaud the book’s explanation of that conflict and the 
ways in which current doctrine systematically under-protects speech.40  As Rothman 
points out, and as I have argued elsewhere, the lack of a coherent normative rudder 
for the right of publicity has led courts to balance publicity and speech interests in 
an ad hoc manner that favors traditional forms of expression, penalizes uses that 
courts view as exploitative, and inevitably chills speech.41  Scholars have sought 
ways to restore balance.  Rothman advocates a “return” to a privacy-oriented, harms-
based approach.42  Mark Lemley and I have urged a consumer protection-focused 
model.43  Mark McKenna suggests an emphasis on individuals’ autonomous self-
definition.44  By focusing on the normative justifications for the right of publicity, 
 
 39. As with alienability more generally, legislatures or courts could place specific limits on the 
ability of parents to assign their children’s right of publicity.  Indeed, the new publicity law proposed by 
the New York state legislature prohibits parents or guardians from assigning their children’s right of 
publicity.  See N.Y. Assemb. B. No. A08155-B, § 2 (proposing amendments to NY Civil Rights Law § 
50-f.2) (May 31, 2017).  
 40. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 3, at 138–59. 
 41. Id. at 138–39; see also Stacey L. Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum: 
Publicity as a Legal Right, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE:  THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF 
IP (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014); Stacey Dogan, The Right of Publicity:  A 
Cautionary Tale from the United States, in THE INTERNET AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NEW 
FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Suzy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, eds., 2016); Stacey Dogan, 
Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right-of-Publicity Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1293 (2016).  See 
generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark 
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006). 
 42. ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 155. 
 43. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 41. 
 44. See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 225 (2005); see also Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:  Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127 (1993) (interrogating all of the independent justifications for the 
right of publicity and finding none of them persuasive). 
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these and other contemporary critiques imply confidence that, if courts could only 
settle on a single rationale for the right, a logical right/speech balancing test would 
follow.  
While the quest for normative coherence deserves continued attention, experience 
suggests that in the right of publicity context, raw judicial intuition shapes the law as 
much as, or perhaps more than, commitment to any particular normative theory.  
Many judges have a deep visceral reaction to the sale of products that use people’s 
images without paying them.  This intuition drove the original Haelan opinion,45 and 
it continues to move judges, particularly in cases involving individual plaintiffs 
complaining of exploitation by commercial interests.46  Although speech concerns 
can sometimes override those intuitions, the prevailing legal standards offer little 
certainty to defendants, except in cases involving dramatic transformation, direct 
critique, or widely accepted traditional forms of expression such as books and news 
reports.47  In these contexts, judges appreciate the social value of the defendant’s 
expression and shape doctrines to enable it to continue, for the benefit of the public.  
The persistence of the anti-exploitation impulse, paired with courts’ sympathy 
toward uses that they view as having social value, suggest a shift in emphasis for 
those of us worried about the balance between publicity rights and other interests, 
including expressive speech.  Thus far, the scholarly critiques of the right of publicity 
have largely focused on the flimsiness of its normative justifications.  Advocates 
have given less particularized attention to the costs that the right of publicity imposes 
upon the public.  Yet a broad right of publicity does not merely guarantee individuals 
a share of the profits from use of their identities; it makes products more expensive, 
deprives the consuming public of quality and variety in celebrity-focused expressive 
products, and in some cases may eliminate products from the market altogether.48  
By describing, demonstrating, and quantifying some of these costs, scholars may at 
least complicate courts’ sense of the equities in cases involving unauthorized uses of 
 
 45. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) 
(recognizing a right of publicity because “it is common knowledge that many prominent persons 
(especially actors and ball-players) . . . would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for 
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, buses, 
trains and subways”). 
 46. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.2d 1268, 1281 
(9th Cir. 2013) (finding right-of-publicity violation by videogame manufacturer who used college athletes’ 
likeness in videogame, and describing the rationale underlying the athlete’s claim:  “[The athlete’s] claim 
is that EA has appropriated, without permission and without providing compensation, his talent and years 
of hard work on the football field.”); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 
(2001) (“In sum, society may recognize, as the Legislature has done here, that a celebrity’s heirs and 
assigns have a legitimate protectible interest in exploiting the value to be obtained from merchandising 
the celebrity’s image, whether that interest be conceived as a kind of natural property right or as an 
incentive for encouraging creative work.”). 
 47. See Dogan, Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum:  Publicity as a Legal Right, supra 
note 41, at 27–37. 
 48. After the video game litigation involving NCAA football players, for example, the 
manufacturer dropped the college version from its line of sports-related video games.  See Alex Kirshner, 
‘NCAA Football’ Last Came Out 5 Years Ago.  Here’s How Gamers Are Keeping It Alive and What Might 
Happen Next, SBNATION (July 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/BCK2-GWZE. 
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names and images.  Over time, this sort of advocacy may soften the automatic anti-
exploitation impulse that supports today’s extravagant right of publicity.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although I have focused my comments on areas of divergence, Rothman’s book 
shares much in common with my views of the state of today’s right of publicity.  The 
right is excessive and unpredictable, it lacks an adequate normative rationale, and it 
poses unjustifiable costs on speech and other interests.  The book does an enormous 
service in shining a spotlight on these problems and theorizing about their causes, 
effects, and appropriate responses.  I’m grateful to Professor Rothman for writing it 
and to the Kernochan Center for giving me this opportunity to share my reactions. 
  
